Tags : Western Sahara, Frente Polisario, Morocco, Algeria, ONU, MINURSO,
The two years of rupture of the ceasefire by the Polisario Front fuel the outbreak of tension between Morocco and Algeria derived from Rabat’s historic claim to that territory
Where there are white vehicles with the acronym of the UN there is an international problem. Where there is a headquarters of the organization, the problem is also old. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (Minurso) occupies the premises of a former school in the center of El Aaiún, not far from the collective taxi rank. It is an ancient building, with a landscaped interior patio, kept in an apparent state of magazine like many other UN facilities in the world with a barracks-like appearance. Nobody has bothered to change the furniture, most of it from before 1991, when he began his mandate after the ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario. The resumption of hostilities between the two contenders for a little over two years now leads the Minurso.
“We are in a situation of low intensity conflict, with incidents on the wall or embankment (which divides the territory of the former Spanish colony, to the west under the control of the Moroccan Army) and drone attacks after the collapse of the ceasefire in November 2020″, says a senior United Nations diplomat, who speaks to EL PAÍS on condition of anonymity. “In Western Sahara there are no other UN agencies that can report, no NGOs or international media, like in other places. Only we can see what happens, ”he explains, referring to the latest report by the Secretary General, António Guterres, to the Security Council, published last October.
Can you imagine a situation without the presence of the Minurso in Western Sahara? “The mission is important and very useful. Above all because we represent a political trip wire (detonation or alarm cable) not only between Morocco and the Polisario, but also between Algeria and Morocco. The situation runs the risk of being much worse, and the tension may increase, with real regional implications for stability”, points out the senior diplomat consulted in El Aaiún.
The political mediation of the current envoy of the Secretary General for the Sahara, the veteran Italian-Swedish diplomat Staffan de Mistura, seasoned in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, remains completely silent. He excepted some signs of stagnation, presumably because of diplomatic pressure from Morocco. In July of last year, everything was prepared at the Minurso headquarters for De Mistura’s visit to El Aaiún. But it was canceled at the last moment when he was in Rabat and had already traveled to the rest of the points on his regular tour: Algiers, Nouakchott and Tindouf (Algeria), where the Saharawi refugee camps are located under the control of the Polisario Front independence movement.
According to the verbal report of a UN official in El Ayoun, the situation suggests that it is now not safe to move around Western Sahara, particularly east of the wall or embankment where the Polisario usually operates. Nor is it possible to resupply the international observer teams from both sides, as was the case before. There have been attacks with drones against water tankers, the same ones that are used by the Minurso teams. For UN personnel, freedom of movement is a basic rule, and if you lack it, you are in danger.
“Demining operations have been halted since the collapse of the ceasefire. We hope to be able to restart them soon. We are in one of the areas with the greatest contamination or propagation of mines in the world. Now there are also unexploded projectiles after the resumption of hostilities, » details a senior MINURSO official.
The UN mission for the Sahara does not have a traditional humanitarian mandate. In Tindouf, Minurso worked in the past with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in adopting confidence-building measures, but this activity was suspended about 10 years ago. It has about 500 local and international members – 300 civilians and 200 military – and deals essentially with operational and logistical issues.
“It would be a lot worse if we weren’t here. There is no other way for the international community to have impartial information on the ground. We received reports of 27 drone attacks last year and were able to investigate 18 of them, » added a senior UN official consulted. “The presence of our observation teams to the east of the wall or embankment deters a regional escalation. The MINURSO military observers are not armed and attacking them is a war crime. That is one of its strengths, ”he argues.
—With everything that is happening now in the Ukraine or in the Sahel, don’t you think that the Western Sahara conflict has been relegated? -I do not think it is like that. A potential worsening of relations between Morocco and Algeria has consequences for the rest of the world. The supply of gas to Europe through the Gibraltar Strait pipeline, for example, is at risk. I don’t see it as a forgotten conflict.
The recent statements by the director of the Moroccan Royal Archives, Bahiya Simu, on the so-called Eastern Sahara, the border part of Algeria that Morocco claimed as its own after French decolonization and for which both countries waged the War of the Sands six decades ago, they have unleashed a political storm on both sides of the deserted border.
Simu spoke in February in Rabat at a forum of the MAP press agency to ensure that « there are historical documents that attest to Morocco’s sovereignty over the so-called Western Sahara, but also over Eastern Sahara. » In his opinion, colonial France handed over Moroccan territory to « French Algeria thinking of continuing to keep the country under its rule. » Tindouf, where the refugee camps controlled by the Polisario Front are located, is the capital of the disputed region.
His words have caused an impact in the neighboring country. The president of the Algerian House of Representatives, Brahim Bughali, has spoken during a public session on the controversial issue of Eastern Sahara. “The Moroccan regime is trying to parasitize our country and sell its expansionist objectives. The National Liberation Army [Algerian Armed Forces] is ready to protect our borders,” warned the third highest-level charge in Algeria, quoted by the Moroccan digital portal Hespress.
From El Ayoun, the senior United Nations diplomat contacted highlights that the world has been involved for decades in East Timor, which is a much more difficult place to find on a map than Western Sahara. “Preconceived ideas about that territory changed. Everything changes. The incidents of November 2020 in the Sahara are a perfect example of this ”, he adds.
―Is the decision of the United States to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara another example?
-Things change. From our perspective, we are in a moment of evolution in a context of political and operational changes. Minurso’s role in promoting regional stability remains important. Our [original] mandate was to organize a referendum [on self-determination]. But I think it would be naive – that is my personal opinion – to think that a referendum could be held tomorrow. The center of gravity seems to be shifting towards other types of political agreements than those foreseen at the beginning of the 1990s.
« But I could be wrong, » concludes the head of the Minurso before saying goodbye in El Aaiún. “If you had asked me in 1998 if there was going to be a referendum in East Timor, I would have said no. The territory voted for self-determination the following year. You never know ».
The African Union summit was held on February 18 and 19, 2023 in Addis Ababa, with the participation of the Prime Minister, Mr. Aïmene Benabderrahmane, in his capacity as representative of the President of the Republic, Supreme Head of armies, Minister of National Defence, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, alongside other leaders and delegations from African countries.
The summit, organized under the slogan “Acceleration of the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (Zlecaf), addressed several issues of concern to the pan-African organization which celebrates its 60 years of existence. These issues essentially relate to international security and peace, terrorism, global warming, economic integration, food security, etc. Aware of the importance of consultation and common African action and the challenges to which it is confronted, in a particularly worrying global context, the President of the Republic instructed the Prime Minister to deliver a message addressing a number of themes including:
International peace and security
For the Head of State, the black continent faces “multifaceted and multidimensional threats that affect peace and security, such as the phenomenon of terrorism, wars, climate change, food, energy and health crises. These threats have been exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine…”. Faced with these threats and challenges, Africa must, more than ever, make its voice heard on the international scene and especially within the Security Council, the United Nations peace and security body responsible for issues of settlement of Conflicts.
Thus, in a speech during the work of the ministerial meeting of the Committee of Ten of the African Union (AU) on the reform of the United Nations Security Council, held on the occasion of the 36th Summit of Heads of State and government of the AU, read on its behalf by the Prime Minister, Mr. Aïmene Benabderrahmane, Mr. President of the Republic did not fail, first of all, to salute « the spirit of continuous cooperation and the fruitful coordination established between the representatives of brotherly African countries in international and regional fora to make heard the voice and the unified position of Africa”. Efforts which aim « to obtain two permanent seats within the UN body and to increase its quota of representativeness at the level of non-permanent seats, from three to five seats.
For our country, as for other African countries, a reform of the Security Council, he specifies, is imperative « to achieve a more representative and fairer world order ».
Climate change: redefining priorities
In another speech, this time on the report of the Committee of Heads of State and Government responsible for climate change, the President of the Republic insisted on the fact that « African countries must redefine their priorities in the fight against climate change, as a continent with a common destiny ».
He insisted on the African strategy to fight against climate change, in anticipation of the next international deadlines, stressing that « far from any value judgment on the success or not of COP-27, we must understand the strategic change targeted by the developed countries, namely the construction of an international framework for climate action, far from the Rio principles, guaranteeing emerging countries their right to development ».
The continent’s partners have defaulted on their financial commitments made in the « Paris agreement », while African countries are required to bear more than their capacities allow, which, he said, risks to « compromising our food and energy security ». Another point raised, the President of the Republic recommended giving the issue of financing for adaptation, loss and damage linked to climate change the same importance during the negotiation process within the framework of the agreement framework in order to obtain convincing results. If Africa has undertaken the creation at the continental level of a mechanism for protection against disaster risks and support for the adaptation strategy to support African countries in their efforts to deal with these phenomena.
Regarding the fair energy transition, he reaffirmed the need « to adopt a process allowing the harmonization of climate requirements towards a priority of fighting poverty and guaranteeing a dignified life for our peoples, rejecting the widespread concept , that there is only one process to achieve this transition”. African countries certainly support or work towards accessing sustainable modes of production and consumption, based on low-emission technologies and techniques, but it is also « important to maintain a certain degree of rationality to guarantee the realization of the objectives of sustainable development, and this, according to the capacities of each country and region”.
Finally, Mr. President affirmed that concerning the countries of the African continent, this initiative « had a favorable echo and considerable support during the Conference of Sharm El Sheikh, even if certain countries expressed some reservations », underlining that « we We have before us an opportunity to redefine this approach and make it a uniting factor of the ‘global South’”.
The Libyan question: no effort will be spared
The day before the AU summit, on February 17, 2023, a high-level meeting on Libya was held, an opportunity for the President of the Republic to highlight the « intensive and tireless » efforts made for reconciliation in Libya, welcoming « the new momentum launched recently to activate the inter-Libyan dialogue process and launch dialogue initiatives between the Libyan brothers, aimed at bringing views closer together, establishing mutual trust and broadening consensus. And to underline that « despite concerns about the crisis situation, optimism remains in order, given the goodwill displayed by the Libyan parties to overcome the hardships and make the supreme interest of the fatherland prevail ».
Positive and satisfying steps have been taken, reflected in particular by « the return of the 5+5 Joint Military Committee to meetings after a long interruption, to follow up on the implementation of the decisions agreed upon concerning the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign fighters, the ceasefire and the exchange of prisoners », in the sense that « the dangerous stage of political and security instability, the blockage of the negotiation process and the institutional split have put to the test all the gains made in the process of resolving the crisis in this neighboring country, given the serious repercussions on the security and stability of neighboring countries and the Sahel ».
As far as it is concerned, Algeria has always « expressed its rejection of the logic of force » and called « for dialogue and reconciliation to prevail between all the components of the Libyan people », in addition to the fact that it condemns » foreign interference in the internal affairs of this brotherly country and the involvement of several foreign parties in the violation of the arms import ban”.
Also, from this rostrum, she renewed her call to foreign parties to respect Libyan national sovereignty, its territorial integrity and the sovereignty of decisions, convinced in this that « the lasting, comprehensive and definitive solution passes through a process enshrining the principle of national ownership, preserving the national unity of Libya and its sovereignty over all of its territories ».
To this end, Algeria reaffirms its commitment to spare « no effort, within the framework of the Group of neighboring countries of Libya, in collaboration with the regional and international organizations concerned, to enable the Libyans to concretize the priorities of this stage important in order to preserve the security and stability of the neighboring countries, directly affected by the situation in this country ».
US$1 billion for development projects in Africa
On the occasion of this summit, the President of the Republic decided to grant one billion dollars to the Algerian Agency for International Cooperation for Solidarity and Development, intended for the financing of development projects in African countries.
This approach stems from Algeria’s firm conviction that stability and security in Africa are closely linked to development.
In the message of the President of the Republic, read from the rostrum by the Prime Minister, it is underlined: « I have decided to inject an amount of one billion US dollars for the benefit of the Algerian Cooperation Agency for solidarity and development for the financing of development projects in African countries, in particular integration projects or those capable of contributing to accelerating development in Africa”.
How the latest AU decision on Western Sahara could affect other crises
At its 31st summit in Nouakchott, Mauritania the African Union (AU) decided to limit its own peace efforts in the Western Sahara in order to support the process led by the United Nations (UN). This support will be through a troika of heads of state, together with the AU Commission (AUC) chairperson. The move is a big win for Morocco, which believes the AU-led efforts are biased. However, it could set a precedent for other AU member states that disapprove of AU interventions.
Morocco’s return to the AU and subsequent election to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in January 2018 has brought a new dimension to the AU’s approach to the crisis in Western Sahara. In the past, the AU usually described this as a ‘decolonisation’ issue and accepted the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a member. This membership is still seen by Morocco as proof that the organisation is not impartial.
Morocco has often objected to the way the PSC – at the level of ambassadors in Addis Ababa – continues to call for the territory’s independence.
The AU’s decision in July 2018 to fully support the UN process in order to resolve tensions between member states could therefore be seen as a victory for Morocco. The assembly appealed to the parties in the conflict ‘to urgently resume negotiations without pre-conditions and in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN, whose Security Council is seized of the matter’.
This decision is also in line with the outcome of the UN meeting in April 2018 that urged member states to support the UN peace process, which involves negotiations between the parties.
Some view the 31st summit decision on Western Sahara as a compromise to prevent the deterioration of the relationship between Morocco’s allies and staunch supporters of Western Sahara such as Algeria, South Africa and other countries in Southern Africa. Keeping the discussions out of the PSC could be a way to avoid confrontation.
However, the decision has serious implications for the PSC, owing to the precedent it sets for other member states.
Reversal of prior AU decisions
The latest decision to provide decisive support to the UN process is a reversal of the AU’s January 2018 decision, which called for ‘joint AU and UN facilitated talks for a free and fair referendum for the people of Western Sahara’.
The new decision also states that the AU will engage the issue mainly at the level of the newly established troika, which is made up of the outgoing, current and incoming AU chairpersons and the AUC chairperson. The troika will provide support to the UN process and report directly to the AU Assembly and, if need be, the PSC, but only at the level of heads of state.
The decision nullifies the ad hoc committee of heads of state on Western Sahara that was established in 1978, during the early years of the violent confrontations. The Nouakchott decision also makes no mention of the AU high representative for Western Sahara, currently the former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano.
Precedent for other member states
This latest Western Sahara decision is crucial for the AU and the PSC because, for the first time, the AU has taken a formal decision to limit the PSC’s involvement in a crisis in Africa. Since the re-launch of the continental body as the AU in 2002 and the operationalisation of the PSC in 2004, the PSC has seen itself as a major player in every security issue on the continent.
In line with the PSC Protocol, conflict situations on the continent are discussed by the 15-member PSC at all levels. Most of the time it is at the level of the Addis Ababa-based permanent representatives, who meet regularly on security issues irrespective of whether the peace processes are led by other intergovernmental organisations.
For instance, the PSC has engaged on several issues, including the situations in Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, where the UN and sub-regional actors play dominant roles. While the AU may play a minimal role in a peace process, the PSC’s discussions complement mainstream processes, thereby enabling the AU to fulfil its day-to-day conflict management role.
While the PSC has shied away from discussing certain emerging security threats such as Cameroon and Zimbabwe owing to political pressure from member states, no formal decision was ever made in this regard. As a result, nothing prevents the PSC from putting it on the agenda of its deliberations at ambassadorial level in future.
Impact on the PSC working methods
The assembly’s decision to limit the PSC’s role in Western Sahara to heads of state could negatively impact the council’s working methods. PSC summits at the level of heads of state take place only once or twice a year and are usually scheduled to discuss a burning crisis situation. The past few summits since 2016 have been devoted to the situation in South Sudan.
This means that the Western Sahara issue may not make it to the PSC summits and, even if it does, there may not be binding decisions, given that the AU is meant to support the UN process.
The implications for other issues are evident. In future, member states that disagree with the PSC’s involvement could insist on a UN process with the support of heads of state. This not only affects the working methods of the PSC but could also undermine its relevance in addressing certain security threats on the continent.
Limits of the AU troika
Experience also shows that committees of heads of state often lack the political will to deal with crises. Besides, the troika of former, current and future AU chairs is a notion that is not inscribed in the AU Constitutive Act and it has no real powers outside the AU Assembly. Similar high-level committees were set up in the past to address conflicts in Libya, Burundi and South Sudan, but failed to record any major milestones in either setting the agenda for peace or effectively resolving the crises in those countries.
Going forward, the AUC chairperson has a responsibility to include the issue of Western Sahara on the agenda of the AU Assembly and PSC summits of heads of state. This includes developing a roadmap for the AU troika to meet regularly to urge the UN to accelerate efforts to resolve one of Africa’s long-running crises.
Cable in which Algeria rules out a confrontation with Morocco
President Bouteflika assures, at a meeting in 2005, that the Sahara question will not lead to a ‘casus belli’.
03 DIC 2010 – 22:30 CET ID: 38855 Date: 2005-08-19 11:35:00 Origin: 05ALGIERS1753 Source: Embassy Algiers Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Dunno: Destination: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001753
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2015 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PBTS, WI, AG, MO, Algeria-Morocco Relations, Polisario SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR DISCUSSES WESTERN SAHARA, ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS WITH BOUTEFLIKA
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) Summary. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, accompanied by Ambassador, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, and members of his delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika the morning of August 18. Following the meeting, Senator Lugar and his delegation departed for Tindouf to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario.
Lugar expressed appreciation for Bouteflika’s efforts to create new momentum for resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Bouteflika recalled his commitment to President Bush in 2001 to support James Baker, noting that he had done so and accepted the Baker Plan, but when Baker quit he had left a vacuum that had not been filled. Bouteflika reiterated his assurance that Western Sahara would not be a casus belli for Algeria, but said the Polisario had the right to resume fighting « on its own territory » if it chose to do so. Bouteflika insisted that Algeria would respect the outcome of a referendum no matter what it was, but would not be a party to negotiations with Morocco on behalf of the Sahrawis. Bouteflika sharply complained about Morocco’s last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting with King Mohammed in Rabat in June by Prime Minister Ouyahia, saying he could not accept « dealing with diplomatic relations in such an irresponsible manner. »
Referring to advice from Presidents Bush and Chirac that he bear in mind King Mohammed’s youth, Bouteflika said, « I am not Jesus Christ, and will not turn my other cheek. » Algeria was ready to discuss « objective interests » with Morocco, but only if the Moroccans were « serious. » Senator Lugar noted that President Bush had asked him to undertake this humanitarian mission, adding that the U.S. wanted Algeria and Morocco to reopen the land border and reengage at the highest level. Did Bouteflika think the Moroccans understood his position on a referendum? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara had been on the UN’s agenda since the 1970s. Algeria favored respecting international law and was defending the right of self-determination, but would not accept being a negotiating partner on the fate of the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the U.S. End summary.
LUGAR MISSION ————-
2. (U) Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Richard Lugar and his delegation, which included Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, visited Algeria August 17-18 as part of a Presidential Mission to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario Front in Tindouf. Senator Lugar, Ambassador, General Jones, and members of Lugar’s delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika for two and a half hours the morning of August 18 before flying to Tindouf. NEA DAS Gray, EUCOM J-5 General Gration, NSC Director Pounds, and DCM also attended the meeting, at which Bouteflika was flanked by Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir, Chief of Defense General Gait Saleh, Council of the Nation President Bensalah, and Minister Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Messahel. Septel reports Lugar and Bouteflika’s discussion of U.S.-Algerian relations and a number of regional issues.
A HUMANITARIAN MISSION ———————-
3. (C) Senator Lugar began by conveying the greetings of President Bush, who fully supported the humanitarian mission to secure the release of the Moroccan POWs. The initiative taken by Bouteflika should create new opportunities for Algeria and Morocco and develop momentum toward resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Lugar noted the UNSYG’s appointment of a new personal envoy, van Walsum, as a positive sign of the UN’s support as well. Bouteflika warmly welcomed Senator Lugar and his delegation, adding that he was aware of the Senator’s record of reaching consensus. Bouteflika said he was aware that there were some concerns in Washington about Lugar’s planned meeting in Tindouf with Polisario leader Abdelaziz, but commented that there was no need for concern since this was a strictly humanitarian mission. The Sahrawis, he said, would talk about their concerns, but this should « not offend anyone from the land of Washington and Wilson, » the leader of a war for independence and the founding father of the idea of self-determination.
4. (C) Bouteflika recalled his first meeting with President Bush in 2001, at which the President had asked him if he was ready to work with James Baker. Bouteflika promised the President he would work cooperatively with Baker and had done so (i.e., accepting the Baker Plan and getting the Polisario to accept it as well) until Baker had resigned. Baker’s resignation had left a vacuum in the settlement process that still had not been filled. Bouteflika praised Baker for being able to see the needs of both sides, Morocco and the Polisario’s. Baker « represented the American values we admire. »
WESTERN SAHARA NOT A CASUS BELLI, BUT POLISARIO HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIGHT ————————————-
5. (C) Recalling the Houston Agreement negotiated by Baker with Morocco and the Polisario, Bouteflika said he had still been out of politics then. But at the time, he had thought the agreement flawed because it did not set a deadline for implementation. He said that if he had been the Polisario, he would have signed the agreement but insisted on the right to take up arms after six months or one year if it were not implemented. The Polisario was now paying the price for not insisting on a time limit.
6. (C) Bouteflika said that when he became President in 1999 he had taken a position that was not completely accepted at the time by the army and intelligence services, i.e. that the Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria. The Polisario cannot drag Algeria into war, he stressed. But if they decided to fight « on their own territory, » that would be their decision. If they did so, they would not be allowed to fight in Western Sahara and then return to Algeria as a base.
MOROCCO MUST GO BACK TO UN ————————–
7. (C) Bouteflika said he had urged Morocco to return to the UN framework. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the international community mobilized itself, but the Western Sahara was considered a « mere tribal issue » even though it had been a Spanish colony. Bouteflika criticized Spain, saying the Spanish Socialists had not been honest with the Sahrawis. From time to time, Spain approached Algeria about entering negotiations with France, Morocco and Spain to resolve the conflict.
Algeria, however, had no claim to the Western Sahara and would not negotiate on the Sahrawis’ behalf. Bouteflika stressed that he was only advocating self-determination, a principle enshrined in the UN Charter. Morocco wanted improved relations with Algeria, but Algeria would not respond until Morocco agreed to return to the UN framework. The only thing Algeria asked of Morocco was to accept UNSC resolutions and international law. That is my sincerest hope, Bouteflika said.
ALGERIA WILL ACCEPT RESULT OF REFERENDUM —————————————-
8. (C) Bouteflika said he was ready to sign a document now committing Algeria to accept the result of a referendum, whichever way it turned out. He said he realized a referendum was a « Pandora’s box, » but Algeria would accept the outcome. Algeria would defend the right of self-determination even if it was the last UN member-state to do so.
« I AM NOT JESUS CHRIST » ———————–
9. (C) According to Bouteflika, bilateral relations with Morocco had started to gain momentum earlier this year. Prime Minister Ouyahia was ready to visit Rabat with a large delegation. There were many bilateral agreements with Morocco dating to the 1960s and they were in serious need of review. The Moroccans informed Bouteflika that King Mohammed would see Ouyahia and his delegation. Then, only an hour later, the Moroccans said that « circumstances were not favorable » for the visit, even though it had been prepared months in advance. Bouteflika underscored that he could not accept dealing with diplomatic relations « in such an irresponsible manner. » Morocco would always be Algeria’s neighbor, neither country would move and they had to get along. But it was unacceptable to handle serious issues in an « infantile manner. » Bouteflika said that in his discussions with Presidents Bush and Chirac, among other leaders, he was told that the king was young while he was a veteran diplomat. But, he said, « I am not Jesus Christ » and will not turn the other cheek.
10. (C) Bouteflika recalled that he was born in Morocco and knew that country very well. Morocco stood to gain a great deal from reopening the land border, since north-east Morocco depended on trade with the Oran region of Algeria. Even with the border closed, Morocco makes three billion Euros a year from smuggling, he claimed. Both countries have objective interests in better relations, but if the Moroccans want to discuss normalizing relations they must be serious about how they treat Algeria.
11. (C) Turning to the Arab Maghreb Union, Bouteflika said that if the Libyans organized a summit, he would attend in order to make it a success, not to embarrass anyone. As soon as Morocco returned to the UN framework for the Western Sahara, Algeria would engage on bilateral relations and the AMU.
U.S TRIES TO DO THE RIGHT THING ——————————-
12. (C) Senator Lugar said the United States tried to act in a manner consistent with democratic values of human rights and respect for the right of self-determination that Bouteflika had mentioned. The U.S. acted even when its own national interests were not directly engaged when it was the right thing to do. It was in this context that President Bush had asked that the Senator undertake this mission. The President respected Bouteflika’s initiative to gain the release of the prisoners and was looking for ways to improve Algerian-Moroccan relations. The U.S. believed the two countries should reopen their border and reengage at the highest level. The U.S. wanted to work with Algeria to see how we could make a difference.
13. (C) Senator Lugar asked whether Bouteflika thought the Moroccan Government understood his position that Algeria would support the results of a referendum no matter what they were? Was the question of who would have the right to vote still a significant issue? What were the other principal issues? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara was not a new issue for the UN. Baker had done very good work, and the UNSYG had a complete list of voters in a referendum. Algeria will accept the results of a referendum, but that did not mean it would « condone Moroccan tricks. » The Western Sahara has been on the UN agenda since the 1970s, at the same time as Brunei, Suriname, and Belize, all of which were long since independent. Algeria supported respecting international law. It would not accept being a negotiating partner on the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the United States, but Algeria would defend the right of self-determination.
Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, Spain, Juan Carlos, Transition, Mauritania, Frente Polisario, Algeria,
National Intelligence Bulletin November 15, 1975
Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania agreed yesterday to set up a joint provisional administration to govern Spanish Sahara withdraws completely early next year.
The Spanish information minister predicted yesterday that Spain would be out of the Sahara by the end of February. He said that details of the new agreeement would not be made public by Spain until the Spanish parliament completed the process – scheduled to start newx Tuesday- of formally decolonizing the territory.
Preliminary comments from Spanish officials indicate they are unhappy with the pact. One spanish officials who has been involved in the negotiations told the US embassy in Madrid that it was a « bad agreement », but was made necessary by the UN’s demonstrated inability to prevent the situation from degenerating into war.
With the agreement, Madrid has abandonned ist insistence on a referendum for the area. The Spanish official said that « consultations3 will be held with local tribal leaders on the future of Spanish Sahara. Madrid is uneasy about the arrangement because it expects Algeria to be displeased. Algeria is Spain’s main supplier of natural gas, but Madrid apparently preferred to risk its energy supplies ratcher than become engaged in hostilities in the Sahara.
The UN may not have a role now that it has been presented with an accomplished fact. At best, there may be an attempt to obtain UN approval.
The agreeement is victory for Morocco’s King Hassan, who has long sought to annex at least part of Spanish Sahara. Hassan will be able to present the new joint authority as fulfilling a promise he made in August to liberate Spanish Sahara by the end of the year.
As co-administrators; Rabat and Nouakchott will be able to hand-pick Sahara tribal leaders -including the head of the territory’s general assembly, who defected to Morocco- for any « consultations ». The outcome of such « consultations » would almost certainly be a decision to partition the territory; giving to Morocco the northern region; with its rich phosphate deposits; and to Mauritania the southern portion; with its iron ore.
Algeria looks like the big loser. The Algerian Foreign Ministry yesterday issued a statement indicating that Algiers would not approve any agreement to which it had not been a party. The statement strongly reiteratd Algeria’s unequivocal support for the principle of self-determination, suggesting it attends to push for a referendum for Spanish Sahara. An official Algerain news agency warned Madrid that any action to divide the territory would be a grave mistake. The agency said such an action would jeopardize Spain’s interests; apparently a reference to Algeria’a natural gas. Although the agency did suggest that the Saharan people would fight to liberate their homeland, it did imply that Algeria would participate directly in the struggle.
Algeria will; as a firts step, try to enlist support in the UN to reverse the agreement. Algiers will note that the proposed « consultations » are not in accord with an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which upheld the Saharan’s right to self-determination. Althoug a UN report last month stopped short of backing a referendum explicitly, earlier assembly resolutions endorsed self-determination.
The Algerians will also move to create as many problems for Morocco as possible. The will, for example, continue to provide arms, training, and possibly some « volunteers » to the Polisario Front, a pro-independence Saharan group. With sanctuary in Algeria and suffient arms, a relatively small number of Front guerrillas could carry out sabotage and terrorist attachs directed against the new joint administration. Algiers could also renew its support of dissidents inside Morocco.
Algeria would probably hope that a Polisario insurgeny againt Moroccan occupation would tie down a large number of troops for some time to come. The Front already claims it controls part of the territory. Front leaders want a complete independence for Spanish Sahara and have vowed to fight to achieve that aim. Press reports from Algeria say that as many as 2555 armes Polisario members aren in the territory.
Spain
Prince Juan Carlos is extracting maximum advantage out of his status as « temporary » head of state.
Capitalizing on the emergeny nature ot the Sahara problem, he has acted decisively and is given much of credit for reversing the Moroccan march. His leadership imagr has been strengthened by his chairing of two National Defense Council meetings -something Franco rarely did. Juan Carlos’ handling of the Sahara issue to date has also improved his rapport with top military leaders whose support he will need in the months to come.
Althoug Juan Carlos has not been as assertive on domestic issues, Franco’s continued presence has given the prince an excuse not to be. Eben so, the media have applauded Juan Carlos for the recent indications that the government is taking stemps to resolve the sensitive issue of regionalism.K On November 11 the cabinet adopted a decree -initiated several months ago- setting up a commission to prepare a special administrative statute for two of the Basque provinces (…) The press has also reported that a decree approved last May authorizing the teaching of regional languages in schools and their use in local government activities will also be issued soon.
In general, however, there is a paralysis in domestci policy-making will probably continue as long as Franco lives. During the interregnum, the activities of the ultra-right -if left unchecked- will ci-omplicate Juan Carlo’s efforts to open up Spanish society after he is sworn in as king. Blas Pinar, leader of the ultra-right New Force, has been holding rallies around the country warning of the dangers posed by political parties. Pointing out that the monarchy will derive its legitimacy solely from Franco, he has called Juan Carlos to purge the government of all who have not supported Francoism.
Right-wing extremists, such as the Guerrilas of Christ the King; who have been linked to the New Force, have recently beaten up student demonstrators and opposition lawyers, and sent threatening letteres to oppositionists and even to some of the more open-minded establishment figures.
Security forces, meanwhile, have taken full advantage of th’ wide powers granted by last summer’s anti-terrorist decrees to step un arrests and repress all forms of dissent: Il the past few days; according to press estimates; more than 100 people have been arrested, including the editor of the presigious independe newspaper Ya who was indicted for publishing an article on the succession. Six priests have been fined because of their sermons, and the government has banned several conferences by important professors, including former minister Ruiz Gimenez.
Juan Carlos will not be able to postpone domestic policy decisions much longer even if Franco lives. A decision is due on a successor for Rodriguez de Valcarcel; the conservative president of parliament whose six-year term expires later this month. The position is important because the incumbent automatically becomes president of the Council of the Realm, which is instrumental in the choice of new prime ministers, and the three-man Council of the Regency, which will govern from the time of Franco’s death until Juan Carlos is sworn in.
Should Juan Carlos decide to retain Rodrgiuez de Valcarcel, the decision will be interpreted by the Spanish left as Francoism without Franco. If someone else is chosen, his political credential will be carefully examined for clues as to the direction in which Juan Carlos plans to take Spain.
Morocco, Algeria, Polisario – Why USA is engaged in Western Sahara conflict
Algeria-Morocco Crisis: The first American war in a long time which is not for oil but for food
The United States of America has waged many devastating wars for oil. Of course, the military-industrial complex of America, or what is also known as the ‘deep state’, wages wars across the world to mint money for the United States, but that is a story to be told some other day. Today, with the Biden administration at the helm of affairs in Washington DC, the main drivers of war seem to be shifting. Now, the United States expects to not import any oil by 2035, owing to its own fracking revolution.
But it does need food until human civilisation prevails on the face of the earth. There is no alternative to breakfasts, lunches and dinners. And the United States depends, like all other countries, on one particular region of the world for food. And that region is called the Western Sahara. Coincidence, right? We have been talking so much about the Western Sahara, the Morocco-Algeria conflict and how Joe Biden is trying to stoke tensions in North Africa. Today, we tell you the one reason behind the American deep state’s thirst for war in Western Sahara.
Phosphate – the rock crucial for human existence: World agriculture depends on phosphates. Phosphate, along with nitrogen, is one of the two most necessary components of synthetic fertilizers. Phosphate, unlike nitrogen, is a finite and exhaustible resource – much like oil. Western Sahara – a disputed region between Morocco and Algeria, has perhaps the second-largest phosphate reserves in the world, after Morocco itself. Together, Morocco and Western Sahara hold more than 72% of all phosphate-rock reserves in the world. And Western Sahara is currently under the control of Morocco.
According to the Atlantic, in the 1960s, the widespread use of synthetic fertilizer, part of the Green Revolution, allowed millions of people who would have otherwise starved, to be fed by dramatically expanding the land suitable for agriculture around the world. So, phosphate is crucial, and this resource is currently under Moroccan monopoly. Does the Biden administration like such vast reserves of phosphate being under Moroccan control? No, which is why it is strong-arming the North African country by signalling to it that it could end up on Algeria’s team soon.
World food security depends on Phosphate controlled by Morocco: There are no moral reasons behind the sudden uptick in tensions in the Western Sahara. The fact is, the Biden administration is strongarming Morocco to hand over phosphate control to Washington. Biden seems to be hoping for a deal in which the United States is made a crucial member of Morocco’s phosphate monopoly. The U.S. does not abhor monopolies. It simply abhors those which it is not a part of. And then, recent inflation in the U.S., apart from stores running out of essential supplies including edible items, seems to have given the chills to Biden.
Morocco alone, as a sovereign entity, controls phosphate supplies around the world. This is a nightmare for Democrats, who like to have control over all walks of life around the world. Food – which is essential for all, is what seems to have caught the attention of the Biden administration now. And while America has waged many wars for oil, it is soon about to trigger one for the sake of food.
The following report is from open and closed sources. None of the information has been corroborated by third parties.
ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT
Executive Summary Political Trends
· Gen. Ahmed Kherfi has been replaced as head of the DSI, the domestic security branch of the DRS, by Gen. Bachir Tartag, who has a reputation for brutality in combating islamist subversion.
· Parliamentary elections which are to be held in the first half of May look set to be considerably more transparent than previous polls, and there is a strong possibility that islamist parties will fare particularly well.
· The regime appears to be preparing for a carefully managed hand-over to an islamist dominated coalition government, although this is likely to unsettle the ‘secular-modernist’ within the regime itself.
· In what seems to be a tactical move ahead of the elections, the government has begun legalising new political parties, the better to ensure that no single party can win an outright majority.
Foreign Relations
· Moroccan Foreign Minister S. Othmani’s visit to Algeria – his first foreign trip since taking office – has been taken as a sign that a rapprochement between Rabat and Algiers is making headway.
· Othmani, like his colleagues in the new islamist-led, does not have an entirely free hand, however, and those who really wield power in both Rabat and Algiers still seem reluctant to make compromises over the key issues dividing them: the border, and Western Sahara.
· Morocco has been invited to take part in the second Ministerial Conference on security in the Sahara-Sahel region to be held in Bamako in February, largely because Algiers now recognises that broader international cooperation is necessary to confront the challenge of the spread of weapons from Libya across the region.
· A source at the Algerian presidency has spoken disparagingly of Polisario’s ability to contribute to the counter-terrorism effort in the Sahara.
Security
· After a lull, AQMI’s level of activity picked up again in late December and January. Most incidents were as usual concentrated in Kabylia.
· In the Algiers region, the security forces have clashed with jihadists just to the south of Houari Boumedienne Airport.
· The governor of Illizi province in the south-east has been abducted and held for a time in Libyan territory before being freed by a Libyan militia.
· Both AQMI’s Sahel branch and the dissident group which kidnapped three Western aid workers from Polisario’s camps in Tindouf last autumn have issued communiqués threatening France.
Political Trends
As the Algerian regime gingerly negotiates the changes brought on by the ‘Arab Spring’, there has been a change at the head of the crucial Directorate of Internal Security (DSI) within the DRS intelligence and security service. On Dec. 22, Gen. Abdelkader ‘Ahmed’ Kherfi, who had headed the DSI for just over two years, was replaced by Gen. Bachir ‘Athmane’ Tartag, a DRS career officer with a reputation as a hardliner[1], who was apparently called back from retirement for the occasion.
The move – officially made necessary by Kherfi’s unspecified health problems – attracted an unusually large volume of media comment, most of it speculative (and possibly encouraged by the military and security establishment itself), with various explanations being put forward for the change at the top of this important institution. El Watan claims Kherfi was dismissed because of “the many setbacks suffered by the security services in the fight against AQMI”; Tartag’s task, the newspaper argues, is to “eradicate the last foci of AQMI that still exist in the north of the country and to prevent the possible proliferation of terrorism to the borders with Libya, Niger and Mali, particularly in the wake of the major geopolitical upheavals in North Africa”. Le Matin concurs that Kherfi was ditched because of shortcomings in counter-terrorism, pointing to the kidnapping of European aid workers on from Polisario’s Rabouni camp in October as a particular failing; the appointment of Tartag is “synonymous with a strategic shift in the strata of power”, argues Le Matin. Specialised news portal Kalima DZ notes that Gen. Kherfi “did not know how to, or could not, prevent the spread of riots, strikes, rallies and the media and the return of radical opposition” and suggests that Gen. Tartag will respond more swiftly, and more harshly, to events such as the food price riots that shook Algerian cities a year ago; thus “the Algerian generals have decided to raise a dam against the tide of history”. Another specialised wesbite, Maghreb Intelligence, for its part, places the change at the head of the DSI in the context of a struggle for Lt-Gen. Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Médiène’s succession at the head of the DRS itself, suggesting that Tartag is Tewfik’s preferred dauphin.
A source close to Tewfik to whom we spoke puts the removal of Kherfi down to a “business dispute of some sort” and insists that the change has nothing to do with the Tewfik’s succession – notwithstanding occasional press speculation about his health, the DRS chief “isn’t going anywhere” in the foreseeable future, insists the source. Even so, the choice of such a controversial figure as Tartag – who would certainly be the target of law suits from Algerian exile opposition groups for past human rights abuses should he ever have to travel to Europe – is by no means anodyne, and merits some consideration.
The change at the head of the DRS’ domestic security arm comes at a sensitive time. Although there may be some sense that the Algerian regime has managed to ride out the worst of the turbulence of the Arab Spring, the coming parliamentary elections – due to be held in the first half of May – are likely to be a delicate moment. Conditions may not be in place for completely free and fair elections (amongst other things, the deeply flawed electoral registers have not been revised, leaving the door open to instances of multiple voting and other abuse), but the signs so far are that the regime is preparing for a poll that will be considerably more transparent than previous elections, in which rigging has on occasion been quite egregious – sizeable numbers of international observers are to be invited this time, it would seem, and clear perspex ballot boxes are supposed to replace the eminently stuffable receptacles used in the past. Islamist parties – with considerable support in Algerian society at large, and buoyed by islamist electoral victories in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt – are likely to fare the best in any reasonably free election, and indeed an islamist parliamentary majority could by no means be ruled out. Indeed, it would seem to be in anticipation of this that the “house-trained” islamist MSP announced on Jan. 1 that it was leaving the Presidential Alliance, in which it has been partnered with the FLN and the RND for the past eight years, and striking out on its own (albeit without giving up its ministerial portfolios for the time being). An ‘alternance à la marocaine’ – a carefully prepared and managed handover to an islamist-dominated coalition government – would appear to be the regime’s chosen path, or at least an option that it is prepared to consider. Objectively, a government with an islamist orientation is by no means incompatible with the interests of the regime’s main stakeholders, as long as guarantees are given with regard to their power and privileges (immunity from prosecution for human rights abuses, respect for property rights including for those whose wealth was acquired through their proximity to the state apparatus, etc.) – after all, successive Presidential Alliance governments, under the influence of the MSP and the “islamo-conservative” wing of the FLN led by Abdelaziz Belkhadem, have already done much for the re-islamisation of social mores and, arguably, of the law. But subjectively the regime is encumbered with the legacy of the civil war of the 1990s and 2000s, during which it relied heavily on anti-islamist discourse, expounded most consistently and persistently by the secular-modernists not only in the media and political class but also within the regime’s own ranks, including in the Army and security services. These secular-modernist elements will certainly be alarmed by the slide towards an openly islamist government, potentially provoking tensions within the regime’s own organs. Against this background, the appointment of an officer with a reputation as an unflinching, indeed brutal, enemy of the islamists to head the DSI may be designed to allay such misgivings.
In the meantime, in preparing its tactics for the forthcoming election, the government appears to be doing all it can to balkanise the political landscape, so that no single political force can obtain a majority. In an apparent reversal of past practice, Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia has given the go-ahead for at least ten new parties to hold their constituent assemblies and intimated that full authorisation to operate can be delivered within as little as a month – in plenty of time for the parliamentary elections. Among these are at least three islamist parties: Abdelmajid Menasra’s Front National pour le Changement (a split-off from the MSP), Ahmed Djaballah’s Front pour la Justice et le Développement and Mohamed Saïd’s Parti pour la Liberté et la Justice. While the Moroccan experience suggests that such a tactic can be very effective, it is worth considering that the multiplication of political groups is likely to increase the workload of the DRS, and more particularly the DSI, which has historically made a point not only of monitoring all political formations but also of maintaining agents of influence within them. Be it by accident or design, both the strategy and the tactics currently adopted by the Algerian regime seem to be guaranteed to enhance still further the specific weight of the DRS in general, and the DSI in particular.
Foreign Relations
Several months ago, it will be recalled, Algerian sources began to suggest that, with the old regional certainties crumbling around them, Algeria’s leaders might envisage mending bridges with Morocco, in the hope of securing at least one stable relationship with a neighbouring country. More recently, shortly after Morocco’s parliamentary elections last November in which the moderate islamist PJD emerged as the largest single party, one of the party’s top leaders intimated to us that one of the central points of its programme for government was a “re-examination” of Morocco’s relations with Algeria and a creative re-think of all the disputes between the two countries (see AMSR #109). With the visit to Algiers this week by Morocco’s new Foreign Minister Saadedine El Othmani (one of the PJD’s main leaders), these trends towards rapprochement seemed at last to be coming together – an impression that was strengthened all the more by Algerian media reports that Morocco would henceforth be taking part in meetings of the so-called pays du champ group[2] devoted to security in the Sahara-Sahel region, from which it has so far been pointedly excluded.
El Othmani has made a point of choosing Algiers as the destination for his very first trip abroad as Foreign Minister, but it would no doubt be a mistake to see it as a revolution in relations between the two countries, or even the beginning of one. The PJD may be sincerely committed to reorienting Moroccan foreign policy towards ties with Arab and Muslim countries, beginning by clearing the air with Algeria, but in this as in other domains its hands are not entirely free. The elected, PJD-dominated government is effectively shadowed by what amounts to a parallel government of royal advisors at the Palace – among them El Othmani’s predecessor Taïeb Fassi-Fihri, a long-time friend and associate of the King, who was given a position in the Palace team as soon as he had handed over the Foreign Ministry – and there is little or no realistic chance of El Othmani and his colleagues overstepping the boundaries set by the Palace.
To be sure, as Foreign Minister Fassi-Fihri himself had over the preceding months been making positive-sounding noises about normalisation of relations with Algeria (see AMSR #109). But there can be no prospect of qualitative change in relations between the two countries as long as each continues to insist on the other’s total surrender on the two key bones of contention between them, to wit the question of the border and the fate of Western Sahara, and there is as yet no sign that either Algiers or Rabat is really prepared to grasp those nettles[3]. Indeed, El Othmani was unable to discuss either the border or the Western Sahara question while in Algiers. El Othmani and his Algerian counterpart Mourad Medelci did promise one another that they would meet for “political talks” every six months, and it was announced that an Algerian-Moroccan High Joint Committee will meet in Rabat on February 17, but these steps are altogether in continuity with the policy followed by Fassi-Fihri. Arguably the most striking innovation of El Othmani’s trip to Algiers was his one-on-one meeting with Boudjerra Soltani – the leader of the moderate islamist MSP, who holds no government position – at the MSP headquarters on Jan. 24, after the completion of his official two-day visit.
The day after El Othmani left Algiers, Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman Amar Belani poured cold water on reports that Morocco was to be invited to join the pays du champ. Morocco was not being inducted into the Algerian-led group, he explained, but simply invited along with numerous other countries to attend a far broader meeting on counter-terrorism in the Sahara to be held in the Malian capital Bamako in February. “The central core will remain exclusively limited to four countries – Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania – with the probable addition of Libya, when the Libyans request it,” Belani told news portal TSA, whereas Morocco is “an extra-regional partner which is not concerned by the meetings of the pays du champ, such as the one that was just held in Nouakchott.” In other words, what Morocco is being invited to is the follow-up to the Ministerial Conference on Security in the Sahel that was held in Algiers last September (with participation from the United States, other UN Security Council members and the countries of the European Union).
This is a long way short of full-blown security cooperation. But the invitation extended to Morocco to attend the second Ministerial Conference is a breakthrough of sorts – despite pressure from France, Algiers is understood to have refused to invite the Moroccans to the first edition back in September (see AMSR #107). A staffer at the Algerian presidency tells us that the decision to invite Morocco – along with Libya, Tunisia[4] and Egypt – this time round is dictated by one simple necessity: the need to do something about the proliferation of Libyan weaponry across the Sahara-Sahel region, up to and including Morocco, where the authorities have seized weapons that have been smuggled in from Libya[5]. A Mauritanian political source, believed to be close to President Ould Abdelaziz[6], goes further, arguing that Algiers has been “compelled to review its strategy” with regard to counter-terrorism cooperation, in large part because it is “genuinely terrified about the possibility of proliferation of Libyan weapons” on its own territory. The Algerians have been pushed in this direction by a number of warning signs, according to the Mauritanian source: the revival of the Tuareg insurrection in northern Mali (where Algeria was supposed to be the guarantor of peace and national reconciliation), led by Tuareg fighters who have returned from Libya with abundant supplies of arms[7]; an increasingly active presence in southern Algeria itself of AQMI units answering to the organisation’s Sahel leaders Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abdelhamid Abou Zeid; and intelligence the source claims was supplied by the Mauritanian security services relating to an alleged AQMI plan for the destabilisation of southern Algeria. These factors, combined with prodding from the United States, France and (the source claims) Mauritania, are said to have prompted Algiers to begin moving away from the “rigid conception of sovereignty” underpinning its security doctrine, which had been a hindrance to effective cooperation in the fight against transnational terrorism.
According to the Mauritanian political source, the toughest task the Mauritanians faced in persuading the Algerians to be more accommodating was to convince them that drawing Morocco into the fight against transnational terrorism need not affect Polisario’s situation in any way. For his part, the source at the Algerian presidency made only the briefest of allusions to Polisario, noting that questions had been raised in Algerian political circles as to why the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic had not been invited to the Ministerial Conference in Bamako and arguing that, although Polisario was of course concerned by the struggle against terrorism, it “lacks the necessary means to participate effectively”. This rather terse evaluation may reflect a degree of dissatisfaction and frustration on the part of the Algerian leadership with Polisario’s ham-fisted performance in the wake of the kidnapping of Western aid workers from Rabouni camp near Tindouf, on which we commented in our last report.
Security
Following an exceptionally quiet period in the first three weeks of December 2011 (see previous report), Aqmi stepped up its activity in the final days of 2011[8]. The month of January saw a further acceleration, with 23 operations recorded up to January 26.
As usual, the great majority of Aqmi operations took place in Kabylia (out of 34 incidents recorded for the period December 20-January 26, 18 were at the initiative of AQMI, and of these no fewer than 14, most of them roadside bombs, occurred in Kabylia). In the Algiers area the security forces on January 8 ambushed and shot dead two jihadists on the road from Khemis el-Khechna to Hammadi, between the wilayas of Boumerdès and Algiers, about 10km south of Houari Boumedienne International Airport. One soldier was wounded and died in hospital four days later.
Elsewhere, the most remarkable incident came on January 16 when a group of armed men kidnapped the governor of Illizi, Mohamed Laïd Khelfi, near Deb Deb and took him across the border into Libya. He was liberated by Libyan fighters the next day and returned to Algeria on January 18, suffering a broken shoulder. The three kidnappers were locals protesting against heavy prison sentences received by their relatives in a terror-related case in early January.[9] The town of Deb Deb had seen several demonstrations and sit-ins the previous week, prompting the governor to visit the town hoping to calm the situation, only to be abducted on the way back. Aqmi issued a statement dated Jan. 18 “saluting the intifada of our people in Deb Deb” and declaring its support for the locals’ “fight for justice”. It also warned the new Libyan authorities not to hand over the kidnappers to Algeria. Despite its quick denouement, this affair is deeply embarrassing to the Algerian government. The fact that a regional governor was kidnapped[10] so easily by “amateurs” in what should be a high-security zone near the Libyan border seriously dents the credibility of Algeria’s security services at a time when the situation around Algeria’s frontiers remains dangerously volatile.
To the east, Libya remains chaotic. In addition to weapons smuggling, Algerian authorities now have to face the threat of regular incursions by unruly Libyan fighters, while on at least two occasions in January, Libyan fighters detained Algerian citizens who they claimed had crossed into Libyan territory. It cannot be excluded that such incursions could lead to isolated clashes between Libyan militias and Algerian forces.
Across Algeria’s southern borders, while the revival of the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali (see above) adds another dimension to Algiers’ difficulties, Aqmi itself has been comparatively quiet[11]. On January 12, however, Aqmi sent a statement to a Mauritanian news agency saying it has “reliable information” that France, “with backing from Algeria and Mauritania,” is preparing a military operation to liberate Western hostages detained by the group. The statement goes on to warn European countries that such a move “would mean you are signing the death sentence of your citizens”. France was also the target of threats from Jamat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharbi Afriqqiya (Unicity and Jihad in West Africa), the previously-unknown group which on December 10 claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of Western aid workers from Rabouni camp near Tindouf (see AMSR #108). On January 3 the group, which describes its members as Aqmi dissidents, sent a statement to AFP “declaring war on France, the enemy of Islam”, accompanied by a video of the three hostages it captured at Rabouni in October. END
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[1] From 1990 to 2001 – a decade which comprised the worst years of Algeria’s ‘dirty war’ – Tartag, then a colonel, headed the Centre Principal Militaire d’Investigation at Ben Aknoun, Algiers, a unit of the DRS which had a sombre reputation as a torture centre and home base for death squads.
[2] “Countries of the field”. To date, Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania, who, on paper at least, participate in the joint military command (CEMOC) for the Sahara formally established at a summit in Algiers in 2010.
[3] Algerian news website TSA has, it is true, reported that the Algerian police is undertaking “technical preparations” for the opening of the land border, suggesting that the border could be opened to traffic as soon as early May, but this claim – which is by no means without precedent – remains for the time being unconfirmed.
[4] The exact date of the second Ministerial Conference has not yet been set, it would seem, in part because the organisers are still waiting for Libya and Tunisia to confirm that they will send representatives.
[5] This is coherent with what we had heard from Moroccan sources last autumn. One non-governmental source told us in mid-November: “The security forces — police, Border Guard, the Gendarmerie and Auxiliary Forces — are on maximum alert, with specific instructions to take all measures necessary to prevent shipments of weapons, which are supposed to be on their way from Libya, from reaching Moroccan territory. Border areas adjacent to Algeria and Mauritania are subject to exceptional surveillance measures. … Over the past few weeks, vehicles transporting foreigners have [also] been stopped and checked from the area north of Laayoune, and at the entry points to every Sahrawi town and village. The police freely admit they are looking for weapons coming from Libya.”
[6] Who visited Algiers for talks on security with President Bouteflika in mid-December, it will be recalled.
[7] On Jan. 16 and 17, the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad, a new group formed out of a merger of Malian Tuareg rebel factions, launched an offensive with attacks on the towns of Menaka, near the border with Niger, Aguelhok and Tessalit, near the border with Algeria. A number of Algerian soldiers were reportedly evacuated from Tessalit. On Jan. 26, the rebels are reported to have taken control of the town of Aguelhoc near the border with Niger and an abandoned Malian army camp at Léré, close to the border with Mauritania. A Malian government communiqué claimed that “AQMI fighters” took part in the raids alongside MNLA fighters, but this seems unlikely insofar as one of the Tuareg rebels’ complaints against the central government is that it has effectively given carte blanche to AQMI to establish a safe haven in the Tuareg lands of northern Mali.
[8] As a result, the level of jihadist activity in December was on balance comparable with what was seen in the previous months (21 operations all told, down from 23 in November and 22 in October).
[9] On January 2, a court in Algiers sentenced Abdelhamid Abou-Zeid, one of the chiefs of Aqmi in Sahel and a native of Deb Deb, to life in prison and five members of his family to ten years in prison each on charges of “forming an international armed group”.
[10] The first time a regional governor has been kidnapped since the troubles began.
[11] The group’s only reported action being the abduction of a Mauritanian gendarme on December 20, after which it issued a communiqué calling on the “Mauritanian regime” to free two of its prisoners in exchange for the soldier’s release.
Before the Israeli Pegasus, Morocco used the computer control software of the private company Hacking Team to spy on the activities of the UN Secretariat General, related to the Western Sahara issue. According to confidential documents, Morocco is the third largest client of this Italian company and has paid more than 3 million euros to Hacking Team. Including 1.19 million euros for the Moroccan DST, 1.93 million euros for the CSDN (Supreme Council of Defense, chaired by Mohammed VI).
These serious revelations come from 400 gigabytes of information extracted from the website of the company Hacking Team and published by anonymous hackers. The Milan-based company sells spyware for hundreds of thousands of euros to countries and security services that flout virtual ethics, including Morocco. Several confidential documents of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) stolen by the Moroccan services have been revealed by the hacker who acts under the pseudonym of Chris Coleman.
Other documents seem to emanate from other services dependent on the UN General Secretariat. Among these documents, the minutes of meetings of the UN Secretary General with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramtan Lamamra, and with the Chadian President, Idriss Déby. Morocco had set up three monitoring points. In Rabat, with massive surveillance tools from the French company Amesys (Bull-France). In Casablanca and Tangier, with offensive security tools from Hacking Team and Vupen (France) respectively.
According to the NGO, Reporters Without Borders, Hacking Team’s software was identified on the computers of the offices of the Moroccan news website Mamfakinch, a few days after this media had received the Breaking Borders Award 2012 by Global Voices and Google. Malware had been deployed there, via a Word document, which claimed to contain important confidential information.
Shortly thereafter, the electronic site « Algérie Patriotique » published two confidential documents fraudulently stolen by Morocco to learn about Algeria’s intentions. These are the minutes of meetings between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramtane Lamamra, and the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon.
Let us note in passing that the content of these talks proves that Algeria has no double talk and does not plot against anyone. Algeria’s only concern is peace in the region. So why does the Makhzen want to spy on its neighbor?
It is an established fact that Algeria’s diplomatic activities prevent the Makhzen’s people from getting any sleep. Algeria is active internationally and particularly on issues affecting the region facing a major destabilization operation, including through armed conflict in Libya, a situation conducive to the development of terrorist groups, which has had an extension in Mali and a dramatic impact also in Tunisia, as evidenced by the recent attack in Sousse.
This does not please the Moroccan leaders who are doing everything to sabotage the Algiers roadmap on Mali and efforts to bring the conflicting parties in Libya together. The Makhzen is enraged every time Algeria makes progress in this direction. And even more so, when Algeria’s foreign partners give it the thumbs up.
« Algeria plays a key role in the peace process in Mali. I welcome the collaboration of Algeria, Mali’s neighbors, regional organizations and my Special Representative in developing a roadmap in Algiers. It is essential that all relevant actors continue to work together to support the political process, » noted UN SG Ban Ki-moon in the PV hacked by the Makhzen.
Regarding Libya, the UN Secretary General wrote: « I encourage Algeria to support the efforts of my new Special Representative, Bernardino León, to reach a comprehensive agreement on the future of the transition in Libya.
The site Privacy International addresses the issue in the following post:
Facing the Truth: Hacking Team leak confirms Moroccan government use of spyware
On July 6th, the company Hacking Team was hacked: over 400GB of administrative documents, source code and emails are now available for download.
Documents from the hack confirm once again the claims made in our report Their Eyes on Me, the Moroccan intelligence services made use of Hacking Team’s spyware ‘Remote Control System’ to target those whom they perceive as their opponents. The documents show the two intelligence agencies in the country have been renewing their contracts and are currently still using the piece of spyware. Over the past six years Morocco has spent more than €3 million on Hacking Team equipment.
Among the documents, a client list showed that the two Moroccan intelligence agencies – the High Council for National Defence (CSDN) and the Directory of Territorial Surveillance (DST) – have both purchased Remote Control System. The CSDN first acquired it back in 2009 and the DST obtained it in 2012.
In total Morocco spent €3,173,550 to purchase the licenses and maintain the product. In 2015 alone, the CSDN spent €140,000 and the DST €80,000 for spyware that can reach respectively up to 300 and 2,000 targeted devices.
The contracts were both signed through Al Fahad Smart Systems, an Emirati company that acts as an intermediary for government and private companies seeking to purchase “security services”.
The documents also reveal that the Moroccan Gendarmerie was listed as an “opportunity” for 2015 and expected to obtain €487,000 from them.
The documents arrived two months after the Moroccan government threatened members of Moroccan civil society with a lawsuit following the publication in Morocco of the Privacy International report ‘Their Eyes on Me’. The report was a series of testimonies of activists who had been targeted by Hacking Team spyware.
In a press release relayed by the press agency MAP, the Government said they had “filed a lawsuit against some people who prepared and distributed a report which includes serious accusations of spying by its services”. And they added that “(the) ministry has asked for an investigation to identify people behind such accusations to try them by the competent court ».
The staff of our partner organisation in Morocco reported that their neighbours and family members were interrogated by the police following the announcement.
All the claims stated in the report were in fact backed by research from the Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary research group affiliated to the University of Toronto. Back in 2012, they had identified the use of Remote Control System against Mamfakinch, a collective of citizen journalists, whose stories are documented in our report.
Emails from Hacking Team employees, spotted by The Intercept, reveal that their opinion of the Moroccan government had remained untainted. David Vincenzetti, the CEO of Hacking Team, wrote to his colleagues in a recent email: “The King of Morocco is a benevolent monarch. Morocco is actually the most pro-Western Arab country, national security initiatives are solely needed in order to tighten stability.”
Those revelations are, however, yet more evidence that the reality of the Moroccan regime is very different from the public image the Government likes to spread. Far from a liberal Kingdom led by a benevolent monarch, Morocco is in fact yet another regime that has been caught red-handed using highly invasive technology to spy on journalists and pro-democracy activists. And when their wrongdoing is exposed, the government attempts to discredit the solid work of independent researchers and to silence local activists.
The ongoing war in Ukraine, with its recrystallization of allegiances, can provide Algeria the opportunity to return from a shift towards Russia and China back to a more balanced relationship with great powers.
USA: From Strategic Partnership to Irrelevance
In many ways, Algeria’s most direct foreign relations with the United States and Western European countries are focused squarely on its northern neighbors of Spain and France. Yet as the unmatched superpower of the last three decades, the United States has had some type of impact on almost every country’s foreign policy decisions. Foreign direct investments, military aid, and access to American technology are just some of the tools Washington uses to entice its partners and shape their policies abroad. In many cases, securing such ‘gifts’ has become the driver of many countries’ foreign policy, gradually growing the ‘pro-American’ camp.
Algeria, though never unequivocally ‘pro-American’ or officially aligned with the West, is no exemption to this rule. After espousing a ‘subjective neutrality’ in the Cold War era—leaning towards the communist bloc while remaining in the non-alignment movement—Algeria followed the tide of the post-Soviet unipolar world and deepened its ties with the West.
This decision came about less as an ideological shift than due to economic opportunities much needed in the years after the Algerian Civil War (1991-2002). Capitalizing on its geostrategic position, its regional cache as an exemplar of revolutionary struggle against colonial rule, and its considerable military capabilities, Algeria subsequently demonstrated its geostrategic value to Washington. Algiers played a significant role in providing intelligence and assisting in counterterrorism operations targeted against Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and, later, ISIS, thus playing a pivotal part in the ‘war on terror.’
In return, Algiers received large amounts of financial aid and training from its transatlantic partner and the U.S.-Algerian relationship appeared to be on the ascent. Instead, the neutralization of the Daesh threat in 2017, coupled with Trump’s advent to power and his administration’s ‘America First’ approach focused on historical partners and rivals constituted an unfavorable conjuncture for Algeria.
The relationship clearly degraded when Trump decided to recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara over claims of the Polisario Front, Algeria’s strategic ally in checking Morocco. In return, Morocco entered the Abraham Accords, recognizing Israel—Washington’s crucial ally in the Middle East. Both U.S. and Moroccan decisions struck at the heart of Algiers’s national security and foreign policy concerns. The concurrent domestic turmoil of the Hirak movement in 2019 did not leave much space for foreign policy priorities, leaving the new government with little political capital to give a concrete response to this massive diplomatic failure by Algiers’ standards.
Contrary to Algerian expectations that the Biden administration would change course, no reversal of this decision emerged, and the sour relations between Washington and Algiers have not improved since 2020. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that they are currently at their lowest point. This nadir, paired with the recent fallout with France and the simultaneous rupture with Spain over the colonial past of the former and the latter’s new approach to the Western Sahara question have all brought Algiers towards unprecedented isolation from the Western world. In turn, this isolation has resulted in Algeria reinforcing its bonds with revisionist powers and downgrading those with the West, a fact that is showcased by Algiers’ punitive attitude and growing intransigence towards France and Spain.
Russia and China: Open Arms
Over the past two years, the informal alliance of Russia and China have proved happy to bring Algeria closer in response, providing Algeria with a ticket to ‘de-isolation.’ These ties go back decades; Algiers and Moscow have shared a strong bond since the former’s independence and have built a close partnership. Through a 2006 Memorandum of Understanding, Russia’s Gazprom has also helped Algeria’s state-owned Sonatrach to evolve its LNG output.
Security relations are especially close; Algeria is dependent on Russian arms imports, buying 81% of its military equipment from Russia over the last three years and serving as Russia’s third arms largest importer, after India and China. During the 2010s, Russian arms exports increased by 129% percent from the previous decade. In 2022, Algeria is Russia’s third largest arms client only behind India and China. Algeria and Russia have conducted joint military exercises in disputed areas, such as South Ossetia in October 2021, and have agreed to perform a similar activity on the Algerian borders with Morocco in November 2022—an agreement made during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Not only did Algiers acquiesce to this military exercise amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but its diplomats also refused to condemn Moscow in the UN in March, notwithstanding Algeria’s historical adherence to the principle of state sovereignty. In exchange, Russia supports Algeria in the Western Sahara issue—understood as a way to counter Morocco’s alliance with the United States—and it has forgiven billions of dollars of Algerian debt.
Similar to the Russian-Algerian ties, the warm relations with China date back to the Cold War era, especially the Mao Zedong period. Recently, Beijing’s global ambitions buttressed by its mammoth Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project has brought China at the doorsteps of various countries around the world with partnership and investment proposals. North Africa was included in China’s global reach and Algeria is willing to further expand Beijing’s footprint as the latter’s most invaluable regional partner.
China has already heavily invested in infrastructure in Algeria and trade flow between the two old friends has skyrocketed over the last decade. Chinese businesses in the energy and construction sectors are multiplying on the Algerian soil, while Algiers is a partaker in the BRI project. As part of this project in Algeria, Beijing and Algiers have agreed on a $3.3 billion project for the construction of the first deep-water port in Algeria in the coast town of Cherchell, west of the Algerian capital. The port of El Hamdania will be the second largest deep-water port in Africa. Finally, yet importantly, China is gradually becoming a significant arms exporter to Algeria. Since 2018, Algeria has received or ordered around twenty Chinese reconnaissance and combat drones of assorted classes. In 2018 for example, five Rainbow CH-3 and five Rainbow CH-4 drones were delivered to Algeria and as recently as January 2022, the latter ordered six Rainbow CH-5 Chinese drones that constitute the most advanced version of the series.
To sum up, Algeria’s interest in its relations with China and Russia are not new developments. Yet Algeria’s perception of Washington as overtly and continually backing Morocco over itself is pushing Algeria further into the open arms of Russia and China and distancing its former ties with the other camp. Both states are happy to exploit Algiers’s disappointment and sense of isolation. By tapping into the old cold war bonds, the two have proved eager to sever Algeria’s policy of balance between them and the West and bring Algiers firmly into the revisionist camp. This strategy seems to have borne fruits so far: Algeria grows more assertive in its relations with the West, as the ongoing diplomatic crisis with Spain shows.
Rebalancing: Opportunities and Challenges
While Algeria is trying to curb domestic instability and navigate a changing geopolitical landscape, there are diplomatic opportunities and challenges it should consider before being sucked into this revisionist camp by inertia.
To begin with, the Russian invasion in Ukraine might have triggered numerous global ripple effects, such as food insecurity, but it has also generated opportunities for Algiers that may help it deal with the ‘isolation challenge’ it has faced with Western states over the past few years.
In the wake of the invasion, the West demonstrated more unity than any other moment after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The response to Putin’s act of aggression was so uniform and radical that the western countries seemed to rally around a common objective of safeguarding the post-Cold War liberal international order against Russia’s assertive revisionism. However, other actors such as China and Iran have embraced this revisionism and are backing Russia, either explicitly or implicitly.
In its effort to counter this revisionist bloc, the West needs every possible ally and Algeria can use this card to gain from both sides. Algeria has been presented with the opportunity to become relevant in the eyes of the United States once again while keeping channels of communication open with Russia, China, and Iran, at the same time. In other words, Algeria can adopt a foreign policy akin to that successfully employed by India, i.e., unfettered and non-aligned.
Furthermore, the war in Ukraine offers Algeria numerous energy-related opportunities. Spiking oil and gas prices have helped to generate high rents to the energy-dependent Algerian economy, which has suffered from the dive in oil prices during the Covid-19 pandemic. Europe has made it clear that it aims to replace the Russian oil and gas imports with LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) and crude oil imports from other partners, with many planned LNG terminals on the horizon.
Algeria, a longtime energy exporter to southern Europe, therefore has the chance to increase its sales to the whole continent dramatically. By doing so, Algiers will benefit both economically and diplomatically, since it will acquire reinvigorated importance in Washington’s agenda as a crucial partner to Europe’s quest for energy independence, something the U.S. has long prioritized. In fact, Algeria has already harnessed this new dynamic by signing a mammoth energy deal with Italy in April 2022. The agreement will render Algeria Italy’s largest gas supplier, supplanting Russia’s hold on this position for many years.
Apart from addressing its isolation in the Mediterranean, Algiers must restore its ties with France and Spain to benefit the country’s fragile economy. It urgently needs to access large European markets to profit from the soaring energy prices and to exploit the West’s aspirations to end Russia’s quasi-monopoly on energy exports to Europe. The latter will also bring Washington’s attention back to the region. It’s a fine line—Algeria must also address its economy’s over-dependency on the oil sector and the economic precariousness that this entails. Like other victims of the ‘Dutch disease,’ exports become more expensive and its imports cheaper resulting in the decay of other crucial sectors of the economy.
Algeria’s challenge in managing its energy exports is also linked with the galloping domestic demand for energy. The conditions are ideal for Algiers to embark on a rally of energy exports in order to fully recover from the economic regression triggered by Covid-19, but it should do so without neglecting the considerable increase in the country’s population every year, which will translate into growing energy demand domestically.
Nevertheless, a reset with Algiers’ northern neighbors is in order. For such a rapprochement with France and Spain to occur, Algeria should temper the nationalist discourse that permeates its foreign policy with pragmatism and emphasize on the benefits it can reap through further robust trade agreements with its European energy partners. Nor can the thawing Franco/Spanish-Algerian relations be a one sided effort. On their end, Madrid and Paris should also appease Algiers by refraining from raising controversial and sensitive issues, against the latter, and by not publicly siding with Morocco on the Western Sahara issue.
In France’s case, Champs Elysées seem to understand that and appear willing to take steps towards the easing of tensions. President Macron’s recent appeal to his Algerian counterpart demonstrates the French desire for rapprochement. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Algerian independence, the French leader sent a letter to President Tebboune calling for the ‘strengthening of the already strong Franco-Algerian ties’.
Algeria is perhaps in the most critical period in its diplomatic history since the end of the civil war in the 1990s. Pressing challenges on one side and promising opportunities on the other form the current geopolitical environment. Algeria must recognize this, and that as the war in Ukraine continues to reshape broader multilateral relations, Algiers must determine whether it maintains neutrality or drifts further into the revisionist camp—a decision that will affect its position in the regional and the international systems.
European Union, gas, Russia, Algeria, Western Sahara, Morocco, Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Egypt, Qatar,
With Strings Attached: Implications of Europe’s Turn to Mediterranean Gas Samuel Bruning and Dr Tobias Borck
In its efforts to wean itself off Russian energy supplies, Europe is increasingly looking to its southern neighbourhood. But this comes with its own set of geopolitical challenges.
As heatwaves hit Europe, governments across the continent are already worrying about a cold winter and a deepening energy crisis. Since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine five months ago, European countries have been scrambling to reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas imports, not least to limit one of Moscow’s most important sources of revenue. Yet, they also fear that Russia could beat them to the punch and cut off energy flows to Europe before alternative sources have been secured. Russia has already stopped supplying gas to Poland, Bulgaria and Finland, and reduced deliveries to Germany, Italy and other European states.
As Europe searches for alternatives to Russian gas, debates about fracking are re-emerging, and discussions about if and when Europe can import more liquified natural gas (LNG) from leading exporters such as the US and Qatar are drawing much attention. Additionally, European states are turning to old and new gas producers in the eastern and western Mediterranean, lured not least by the promise of short supply routes along which pipelines already exist or could feasibly be constructed.
In the eastern Mediterranean, Israel is emerging as a major gas producer. In June, the EU, Israel and Egypt agreed to work on a partnership that could eventually see Israeli gas be transformed into LNG in already existing Egyptian gas liquification plants before being shipped to Europe. Meanwhile, further west, Algeria, a longstanding gas producer that already sends about a quarter of its gas to Spain, signed a deal with Italy in May to increase its supplies to Europe.
Neither arrangement represents a quick fix. It will likely take years for the necessary infrastructure in Europe, Israel and Algeria to be built and for the latter two to sufficiently increase their production capacity to even begin to replace the volumes of gas Europe imports from Russia. Just as importantly, both deals tie Europe more closely to complex and potentially explosive geopolitical contexts. If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions; considering their strategic implications for European security is therefore vital.
Israeli Gas, Hizbullah’s Drones and the Egyptian Economy
The eastern Mediterranean has long been a highly contested space. Just over the past decade, the overlapping rivalries and shifting alignments among the region’s states – Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey – have shaped (and been shaped) by the conflicts in Libya and Syria, and between Israel and the Palestinians, to name but a few. At various times, these conflicts have repeatedly drawn in extra-regional powers, including European states, Russia, the US and even Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
With the gas deal with Israel and Egypt, the EU has increased its own stake in this complex environment beyond the obligations it already had to its member states of Cyprus and Greece. Two aspects are particularly important to consider.
If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions
Firstly, with the agreement, the EU wades into the longstanding maritime border dispute between Israel and Lebanon. The offshore Karish Field, from which the gas destined for Europe is supposed to come, is adjacent to the area that both countries claim to be part of their own exclusive economic zone. The US government has appointed a Special Envoy, Amos Hochstein, to mediate in the dispute, but negotiations have been progressing slowly – if at all – in recent months.
Buckling under an unprecedented economic crisis and a dysfunctional political system, the Lebanese state’s capacity to effectively engage on these matters is somewhat limited at the moment. But Hizbullah, which suffered a setback in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in May, appears to see the border dispute and the international spotlight on gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean as a useful opportunity to bolster its anti-Israeli credentials. On 2 July, Israeli authorities said that they had shot down three Hizbullah drones approaching a gas rig at Karish.
Hizbullah later said the drones had been unarmed and were part of a reconnaissance mission, but the incident certainly illustrated the volatility of the situation in the area. This does not have to deter Europe from seeking to expand energy trade with Israel or other eastern Mediterranean producers, but the obvious political risks must be taken into account in Brussels and should inform thinking about future security arrangements in the region.
Secondly, the EU–Israel–Egypt gas agreement comes at a time when policymakers across Europe are increasingly concerned about Egypt’s economic stability. Hit hard by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, particularly with regard to food security, the Egyptian government is struggling to contain a potentially burgeoning economic crisis. While macro-economic growth figures have remained relatively strong, inflation and soaring food and energy prices are causing increasing strain. Scarred by the experience of the political instability that gripped the Middle East and North Africa in the aftermath of the 2010/11 Arab Uprisings, and in particular the migration crisis triggered and facilitated by the violent conflicts in Syria and Lebanon, renewed instability in Egypt represents a nightmare scenario for many European governments.
The gas agreement should bring some economic benefits for Egypt, but not necessarily in a way that will help to address poverty and Egypt’s other related socio-economic challenges. The EU will therefore have to ensure that the energy deal is part of a more comprehensive engagement with Cairo that seeks to increase the resilience of the Egyptian economy through reform.
Algerian Gas, Morocco and the Western Sahara
In the western Mediterranean, meanwhile, Algeria has long been an important gas supplier for Europe. Spain has imported Algerian gas via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which runs through Morocco, since 1996, and via the undersea Medgaz pipeline since 2011. However, relations between Madrid and Algiers, including the energy trade between the two countries, have persistently been affected by the conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara, which Morocco claims as its territory, while Algeria supports the Polisario Front that seeks Sahrawi independence. Over the past two years, tensions have steadily grown.
New partnerships with Mediterranean energy producers must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are
In 2021, Algeria decided to end exports via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline and therefore cut off supplies to Morocco, planning instead to expand the capacity of the Medgaz pipeline. Subsequently, in March 2021, Algiers was angered by Spain’s reversal of its position on the Western Sahara. Having previously been mostly neutral on the territory’s status, insisting that it was a matter for the UN to resolve, Madrid endorsed Rabat’s plan to retain sovereignty over the Western Sahara while granting it autonomy to run its domestic affairs. The move was to a significant extent motivated by Spain’s need to deepen cooperation with Morocco to contain migration, particularly to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melita.
As things stand, Algeria has said that it will continue to supply Spain with gas via the Medgaz pipeline. But its Ambassador to Madrid, whom Algiers withdrew in March, has not returned. Moreover, the Algerian government has repeatedly warned Spain not to re-export gas it receives from Algeria to Morocco, which has struggled to make up for shortages caused by the termination of flows via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline.
The new deal concluded in May between Italy’s energy giant ENI and Algeria’s national oil company Sonatrach has to be considered within this context. Even if Italy may find it easier to avoid becoming embroiled in the Algeria–Morocco dispute, the tensions in the Algeria–Spain relationship demonstrate that energy trade in the western Mediterranean cannot be divorced from the geopolitical realities in North Africa.
Searching for a European Position
In the search for non-Russian energy supplies, Europe is rightly looking to its southern neighbourhood. Algeria, Israel and Egypt – and perhaps, in time, other (re)emerging Mediterranean energy producers and transit countries such as Libya and Turkey – can all play an important role in increasing the continent’s energy security. However, these new energy partnerships must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are. More than mere commercial transactions, they tie Europe more closely into local conflict dynamics – be it between Israel, Lebanon and Hizbullah, or between Algeria and Morocco. They should therefore be embedded in a clear-eyed and strategic European approach to the EU’s southern neighbourhood.
In May, the EU published its new Gulf strategy, which offers at least a conceptual framework for how European governments intend to balance expanding energy relations with the Gulf monarchies with other interests, ranging from economic engagement to human rights concerns. The document is far from perfect, and it remains far from certain if and when many of its ambitious intentions will be implemented. But if the EU wants to become a more serious geopolitical actor and increase its resilience to political shocks such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, developing similar strategies for the eastern and/or western Mediterranean is necessary.
